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Insurance Commissioner show without .doubt that,. ac~epting
the testimony of the witneSses concerning the representations
said to have been made by Collins as true, he had reasonable
grounds for believing that they were correct. Certainly those
statements were no broader than the showing made by the
Insurance Commissioner in his verified petition that Great
States was in a hazardous condition... And although, as the
attorney general contends, a company which is insolvent or
unable to carryon its business in accordance with'statutory
requirements may be able to make a better reinsllranceagreement, if everyone of its policyholders continues to pay premiums, an agent who repeats only the charges made by the
commissioner against a company, or fairly states the financial
condition of an insurer upon the basis of information reasonably believed by, him to be true, does not violate the provisions of the Insurance· Code.
The judgment is reversed.
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Gibson, O. J., Shenk, J., Ourtis, J., Oarter, J., Traynor, J.,
and Schauer, J., concuri'ed.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied September 18, 1944.
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[Crim. No. 4543. In Bank. Aug. 28, 1944.]
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. AARON SCOTT, Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law - Former Jeopardy - Identity of OffensesRape.-Under Pen. Code, § 261, a single act of intercourse
amounts to only one punishable offense of rape even though
it be accomplished under more than one of the circumstances
enumerated in that section.
[2] Id.-Appeal-Modification of JUdgment.-Judgments of conviction on different counts charging rape will be consolidated
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 143; [2] Criminal
Law, § 1446; [3] Criminal Law, § 1169; [4] Criminal Law, § 1268;
[5] Indictment and Information, § 74; [6] Weapons, § 10; [7]
Criminal Law, § 1223.
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on appeal into a single judgment where there is hut one
punishable offense.
[3] Id......:..Appeal-Record~Transcript of Prelimiil.a1'7 Examination.-The denial of a motion to. dismiss a count of an information on the ground that the defendant was not legally com., mitted by a magistrate, is not reviewable where the trans(lript
of the prelimmary examination is' not brought up.
[4] Id.-AplIeal-Who May Urge ErrorS-Errors Oonsentedto.A defendant who pleaded not gililty toa count charging viOlation of Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702, cannot complain on appeal
of want of jurisdiction of the superior court on the ground
, that the cause was instituted therein instead of the juvenile
court, where each department of the court had beendesig.
nated as a juvenile court, and where on hearing of the motion
the defendant disclaimed any wish that the court convene on
the count as a juvenile court.
[5] Indictment and Information-Joinder-Offenses Oonnected in
Oommission.-Different offenses may be joined, even though
they do not relate to the same transaction or event, if there
is a common element of substantial importance in their commission. Accordingly, a charge of rape against a person who
intimidated the victim with a firearm and a charge of tampering with identification marks of a pistol may be joined,
AS the possession of the weapon is a common and important
element. of each crime. (Code Civ. Proc., § 954.)
[6] Weapons-Presumptions-Alteration of. Identification Marks.
-The Dangerous Weapons Control Act .of 1923, § 13 (Stats.
1923, p. 702; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 1970) making possession of a firearm whose marks of identification have been
'tampered with prima facie evidence that the tampering was
done by the possessor, does not violate the due process clause
of the 14th Amendment of the U. S. Const.
[7] Criminal Law-Appeal-Briefs-Pointing Out Errors.-A reviewing court will not ordinarily consider questions that are
not assigned as prejudicial error or presented in the briefs
of counsel.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Barbara County and from an order' denying' a new trial.
Atwell Westwick, Judge. :Modified and afllrmed.
[5] See 14,Oa1.Jur. 64; 27 Am.Jur. 688.
[6] Statutes making one fact presumptive evidence of another,
see, notes, 31 A.L.R. 1222; 51 A.L.R. 1139; 86 A.L.R. 179. ,Se~,
also; 20 AnLJur. 39.
' .,
., ...
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Prosecution for rape, for contributing to the delinquency
of a minor, and for violation of the Dangerous Weapons 1 Control Act. Judgment of conviction modified and affirmed.,
Fred A. Shaeffer for Appellant.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, David K. Lener, DeputyAttorney General, Lawrence M. Parma, District Attorney, and Thomas P. Weldon, Deputy District Attorney, for
Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J.-I:n an information filed by the District Attorney of the County of Santa Barbara, defendant was accused of rape in Counts I, II, and III, on the basis of a single
act of int.ercourse with a sixteen-year-old girl against her
will. Count I charged statutory rape upon a female under
the age of consent, in violation of subdivision 1 of section 261
of the Penal Code. Count II charged that the rape was accomplished by force and violence in violation of suhdivision 3
of section 261. Count III charged that the rape was accomplished by threats of great bodily harm to the prosecutrix in
violation of subdivision 4 of section 261. Count IV, based
upon the same acts set out in Counts I, II, and III, charged
defendant with contributing to the delinquency of a minor
in violation of section 702. of the Welfare and Institutions
Code. Count V charged the defendant with tampering with
the identification marks on an automatic pistol in violation
of section 13 of the Dangerous Weapons' Control Law of
1923, as amended (Stats. 1923, ch. 339; Deering's Gen. Laws,
1937, Act 1970, p. 999).
The defendant pleaded :q.ot guilty to each count. He was
tried before a jury and convicted on all counts. Separate
judgments were entered on each of the charges of rape in
Counts I, II, and III sentencing defendant to the state prison
for the term prescribed by law. The judgment on Count IV
sentenced defendant to one' day in the county jail, and the
judgment on Count V sentenced him to the state prison for
the term prescribed by law. All of the sentences were to run
concurrently.
[1] It is unnecessary to set forth in detail the testimony
regarding the charges of rape. There can be no doubt of
defendant's guilt as to Count I. He admitted the act of
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intercourse and he admitted that complainant was not his
wife. There was ample evidence that she was only sixteen
years of age. As to Counts II and III the evidence establishes
that the assault was accomplished by force and threats of
great bodily harm to the complainant. The same evidence
supports defendant's conviction on Count IV. The defendant, however, cannot be convicted on three separate counts
of rape, all based on a single act of intercourse. Under section 261 of the Penal Code a single act of intercourse amounts
to only one punishable offense of rape even though it be accomplished under more than one of the circumstances enumerated in that section. (People v. Oraig, 17 Ca1.2d 453
[110 P.2d 403].) [2] The separate judgments on Counts
I, II and III, must therefore be consolidated into a single
judgment. (Ibid.)
[3] Defendant contends that the court's adverse rulings
on his motions to dismiss Counts II, IV and V require a reversal. The motion to dismiss Count II was based on the
ground that defendant had not been legally committed by a
magistrate. (Pen. Code, § 995 (1) .) After reading the transcript of the preliminary examination, the court denied the
motion. This transcript was not brought up on appeal, and
error cannot be assumed in its absence.
[4] The motion to dismiss Count IV was based on the
claim that the superior court, when not sitting as a juvenile
court, is without jurisdiction to try a defendant accused of
violating section 702 of the Welfare and Institutions Code
unless the prosecution was initiated in the juvenile court and
then transferred to the superior court sitting in the exercise
of its general jurisdiction. The juvenile court has original
jurisdiction over all misdemeanors defined in section 702 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code (Inre Gamo, 122 Cal.App.
725, 726 [10 P.2d 770]) and has jurisdiction to impose pun. ishment in such cases when the defendant enters a plea of
guilty. Jurisdiction rests with the superior court if the
defendant, as in this case, enters a plea of not guilty. (People v. Superior Oourt of San Bernardino Oounty, 104 Cal.
App. 276 [285 P. 871]; In re Gamo, supra.) " It was stipulated that each of the two departments of the Superior Oourt
in the Oounty of Santa Barbara has been designated as a
juvenile court. Under defendant's. plea of not guilty it would
bve been an idle act to transfer the ~al!!e tQ the juvenile
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court to be transferred back to the superior court. In any
event, defendant cannot complain that this was not done, for
on the hearing of defendant's motion, the court declared:
"I am telling you specifically that if you wish it, we will
convene on the fourth count as a juvenile court." That was
not what the defendant wished, and the court denied the motion.
[5] The evidence as to Count V shows that defendant had
in his possession an automatic pistol, and that someone bad
tampered with the identification marks in violation of the
statute. The court instructed the jury in the language o~
section 13 of the Dangerous Weapons' Control Law of 1923,
which provides: "No person shall change, alter, remove, or
obliterate the name of the maker, model, manufacturer.'s num·
ber, or other mark of identification on any pistol or revolver.
Possession of any such firearm npon which the sama shall
have been changed, altered, removed, or obliterated, shall be
presumptive evidence that such possessor' haa Clhanged, al.
tered, removed, or obliterated the same."
Defendant contends that his motion to dismiss Count V
should, have been granted on the ground that the violation
of the Dangerous Weapons' Control Law charged therein
and the rape charged in the other counts of the information
could not be tried together. Section 954 of the Penal Code
provides that "An indictment, information, or complaint
may charge two or more different offenses connected together
in their commission, or different statements of the same of·
fense or two or more different offenses of the same class of
crimes or offenses, under separate counts" and that the court
','in the interest of justice and for good cause shown, may,
in its discretion, order that the different offenses or counts
set. forth in the indictment or information be tried sepa~
rately." The statute provided originally that an indictment
could charge only one offense, but an amendment in 1905
authorized a joinder of different offenses if they related to
the same, act, transaction, or event (People v. Plath, 166 Cal..
227 [135 P. 954] ; see 14 Cal.Jur. 64), and an amendment in
1915 permitted the joinder of offenses if they were "connected together in their commission." As it now reads' the
statute permits the joinder of different offenses, even though
they do not relate. to the same transaction or event, if there
is a common element of substantial importance in their como,
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mission, f-or the joinder prevents repetition of evidence and
saves time and expense to the state as well as to the defendant.
(People v. Thorn, 138 Cal.App. 714, 735 [33, P.2d 5]; see
People v. West, 34 Cal.App.2d 55, 59 [93 P.2d 153] ; People
v. Derenzo, 46 Cal.App.2d 411, 415 [115P.2d 858].). The
possession of the firearm in the present case intimidated the
complainant and was' therefore an important element of
the rape.. It was also the basis of the offense charged under the
Dangerous Weapons' Control Law. The possession of,. the
weapon was thus a common and important element of each
crime. Since the joinder did not result in embarrassment or
prejudice to the defense (see Pointer v; United States, 151
U.S. 396, 403 [14 S.Ct. 410, 38 L.Ed. 208] ;,Sheppard v. State,
104 Neb. 709 [178 N.W. 616, 18 A.L.R. 1074];' 27'Am.Jur.
Indictments and Information, § 130), it cannot be held that
justice required, separate trial or that the ~court abused its
discretion in denying defendant's motion.
[6] Defendant challenges the constitutionalitY of 'tlie pro~
vision 'of section 13 that makes possession of a firearm whose
'marks of identification have been tampered' with prima facie
evidence that the tampering was done by the possessor.' He
contends that the rational connection between a fact proved
and the fact presumed required by the due:process clause· of
the 14th Amendment (Tot v. United States, 319:U.S. 463,' 467
[63 S.Ot. 1241,8.7 L.Ed. 1519] ; Morrison v. Oalifornia, 291
U.S. 82, 90 [54 S.Ot. 281, 78 L.Ed. 664]; Western & Atlantic
R. 00. v. Henderson, 279 U.S; 639, 642, [49' S.Ct. 445, 73 L.
Ed. 884]; Manley v. Georgia~ 279 U.S. 1 [498.0t. 215, 73
L.Ed. 575]; Oasey y.; United States, 276 U.S. ,413, 418 [48
S.Ot. 373, 72 L.Ed. 632] ; Yee Hem v.' United States, 268 U.S;
178,183 [45 S.Ot. 470, 69 L.Ed. 904] ; McFarland V. Amer~
can:Sugar Ref. 00.,241 U.S. 79; ,86 {36 S.Ct.498, 60 L.Eel
899] ; Luria v; United States, 231' U.S. 9, 25' [34 S.Ot. 10,58
L.Ed. 101] ; Lindsleyv. Natural Oarbonic 'Gas 00., 220 U.S.
61,81 [31 S.Ot. 337, 55 L.Ed.3'OO1; BaiZey v. Alabama, 219
U.S. '219, 238, 239 [31 S.Ct.' 145, 55 L.Ed. 191] ; 'Mobile J.&
K: O. R: Oo.v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 [31 S.Ot. 130,
55 L;Ed. 78]) does not exist between the fact of possession
lind the presumption that the possessor coMmitted the crime
of tampering with the marks.
:; The rational connection required between a proved fact
and a presumed' fact must be distinguished from the relation
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between a proved fact and an alleged fact that warrants a
jury's inferring the one from the other (Tot v. United States,
supra, at p. 468). An inference must be justified by the circumstances of the particular case. A statutory presumption,
however, designed for general application in a given field
and based on a pattern of experience in that field, is justified
by the likelihood that the unpredictable circumstances of
other cases will fall within the same pattern. The presumption may be invoked if the proved fact is "at least a warning
signal according to the teachings of experience" (Morrison
v. California, supra, at p. 90) of the fact presumed, and "the
evidence held to be inculpatory has at least a sinister significance." (Ibid. p. 90.) The due process clause, however,
forbids the introduction into the law of a fiction under the
cloak of a presumption that would contradict the presumption
of innocence and work a "wrong contrary to the real truth
and substance of the thing" (Hibberd v. Smith, 67 Cal. 547,
561 [4 P. 473, 8 P. 46, 56 Am.St.Rep. 726]) by imposing on
the accused a burden that "is not justified in the light of
experience as to the circumstances of life as we know them"
(Tot v. United States, supra, at p. 468). Thus, a presumption of an intent to defraud based on breach of contr'lct of
employment by an employee who has received an advance
payment is a mere fiction and therefore unconstitutional.
(Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 [31 S.Ct. 145, 55 L.Ed.
191]; see Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 [64 S.Ct. 792,
88 L.Ed. --].) It is likewise a fiction that the possession
of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a crime of
violence or by a fugitive from justice is prima facie evidence
of shipping, transporting, or receiving in interstate commerce
of such firearm by the accused after the date of enactment
of the statute. (Tot v. United States, supra.) It may be a
plausible supposition that the possessor of a firearm might use
it for a crime of violence but there can be no "argument
drawn from experience" (Tot v. United States, supra, at
p. 468) to justify the presumption that such a firearm was
acquired in interstate commerce. The presumption in the
California statute differs from that declared unconstitutional
in the Tot case. It applies to any possessor of a firearm with
impaired marks of identification, whereas the presumption
in the Tot case applied only to a certain group of possessors
of firearms, whose members were no more likely to acquire

'1st

firearms in interstate commerce than others. ,Most important,
the presumption in the California act that the possessor of a
weapon whose marks of identification have been tampered
with committed the crime of tampering with them is based
on the condition that there be proof of tampering with the
marks of identification on the firearm and is therefore concerned only with the identification of the person who committed the crime. The statute in the Tot case made possession of a firearm the basis of the presumption not only that
the possessor was the person who committed the crime, but
that the crime was committed even though there was nothing
suspicious about the firearm to indicate that the crime had
been committed. Presumptions like that in the California
statute, based on the possession of a sinister thing, are traditional in criminal legislation, which frequently imposes on
the possessor of contraband goods the burden of explaining
that he did not acquire or use them unIawfully. Thus the
possession of burglary tools by anyone except artisans and
tradesmen at their places of business (State v. Fitzpatrick,
141 Wash. 638 [251 P. 875]), or the possession by junk-dealers of certain bottles with trade-marks or with trade-marks
obliterated (People v. Cannon, 139 N.Y. 32 [34 N.E. 759, 36
Am.St.Rep. 668]), can be made prima facie evidence of their
unlawful acquisition or of the intent of the possessor to. use
them unlawfully, just as the possession of articles, the sale
of which is forbidden, may be made prima facie evidence of
the keeping for sale of such articles. (State v. Nossaman,
107 Kan. 715 [193 P. 347, 20 A.L.R. 921] ; State v. Barrett,
138 N.C. 630 [50 S.E. 506, 1 L.R.A.N.S. 626] ; Caffee v. State,
11 Okla. Cr. 485 [148 P. 680]; see 33 Words and Phrases,
Prima Facie Evidence, Criminal Law; 28 Columb.L.Rev.
489.) Possession of intoxicating liquor and narcotics particularly has served to impose on the possessor the burden
of explaining the lawfulness of their acquisition and use.
(Casey v. United States, supraj Yee Hem v. United States,
supraj United States v. Yee Fing, 222 F. 154; United States
v. Ah Hung, 243 F. 762; see 9 Wigmore, Evidence [1940]
§ 2513, pp. 423 and 424 and cases there cited; 31 A.L.R. 1222;
51 A.L.R. 1139; 86 A.L.R. 179.) In all such cases the possession of an article that has been or is likely to be made an
'instrument of crime raises a suspicion that justifies calling
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on the accused for explanation. (Casey v. United States,
supra, at p. 418; People v. Fitzgerald, 14 Oal.App.2d 180,
194, 195 [58 P.2d 718].) In the light of these cases the presumption in the present case is not "such a forced arid unnatural one that the legislature may not enact that it shall
be made." (People v. Cannon, 139 N.Y. 32, 46 [34 N.E. 759,
763, 36 Am.St.Rep. 668].)
The Dangerous Weapons Control Act is designed to minimize the dang-<1r to public safety arising from the free access
to firearms that can be used for crimes of violence. The identification of a person who has used a firearm crimh1ally be.
comes more difficult and the attractiveness of a firearm for
criminals is correspondingly increased, if its marks of identification have been tampered with. It would therefore be in
the public interest, to forbid the possession of firearms whose
marks of identification have been tampered with. The mere
threat of conviction to the possessor of such a firearm engendered by the presumption that he did the tampering is less
severe than a statutory prescription of punishment for possession of such a firearm. The imposition of punishment for
the possession of such a weapon is within the power of the
Legislature to regulate the traffic in firearms. Legislation
for regulatory purposes, which dispenses with the condition
of awareness of wrongdoing and places the burden of acting
at his peril on a person otherwise innocent "but standing
in personal relation to a public danger" (United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 [64 S.Ot. 134, 88 L.Ed.
--1 ; see Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57,
69, 'fO [30 S.Ot. 663, 54 L.Ed. 930] ; United States v. Balint,
258 U.S. 250, 252 [42 S.Ot. 301, 66 L.Ed. 604]) is a traditional means of regulation. The protection of the public
interest in eliminating firearms whose marks of identification
have been tampered with by a statute that resorts to the
less severe means of regulation by using the "inherent coercive power of a presumption" (Pollock v. Williams, supra,
64 S.Ot. 792, 802) is likewise within the police power of the
state. (See In re Bear, 216 Cal. 536. 540 [15 P.2d' 489, 83
A.L.R. 1402] ; Amos Bird Co. v. Thompson, 274 F. 702, 705.)
The tampering with marks of identification is ordinarily done
in secrecy, and if the state could not require the possessor
of the firearm to explain his possession. it would hardly be
possible for the prosecution to determine who committed the
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crime. There is nothing unreasonable in requiring the possessor to explain when and how he came into possession of a
firearm whose marks of identification have been tampered
with. The presumption does not impose on him the burden of
proving who committed the crime, nor does it require him
to persuade the jury of his innocence. ' He must merely go
forward 'With evidence to the extent of raising a reasonable
doubt that he tampered with the identification marks. When
he has done so, he enjoys the benefit of the presumption of
irinocence, and it is then incumbent on the prosecution to
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Fitzgerald, supra, at p. 195; People v. Agnew, 16 Cal.2d 655,
665 [107 P.2d 601] ; People v. Post, 208 Cal. 433. 437 [281 P;
618] ; People v. Bushton, 80 Cal. 160, 164 [22 P. 127, 549].)
[7] Defendant objects to the instruction with respect to
the statutory presumption solely on the ground that the statute is unconstitutional. He does not contend that the instructions are otherwise erroneous or that the verdict would probably have been different had other instructions been given.
Since the statute is constitutional, further inquiry as to
possible' error is unnecessary, for the court will not ordinarily
consider questions that are not assigned as prejudiciill error
or presented in the briefs of counsel. (People v. French, 12
Cal.2d 720, 764 [87 P.2d 1014] ; People v. Wier, 20 Cal.App.
2d 91, 94 [66 P.2d 703]; People v.Oowan, 4~ Cal.App.2d
155, 158 [112 P.2d 62]; People v. Britton, 6 Cal.2d 10. 13
[56 P.2d 491].) Even if it be assumed, however, that the
trial court's instruction should have been more specific in
certain particulars, for example, that it should have instructed the jury that defendant was required only to raise
, a reasonable doubt that he did the tampering, it is improbable that the result would have been different. (People v.
, Rog~rs, 22 Ca1.2d 787 [141 P.2d 722] ; Cal. Const., art. VI,
. § 41h.) 'Defendant. was admittedly inconsistent in explaining
.' thesoul'ce from which he obtained the firearm, and the explanation that he finally adhered to at the trial was clearly
• contradicted' by other evidence.
·The judgment as to Counts I, II and III is consolidated
and modified to read "whereas the said Aaron Scott has been
. found guilty of the crime of rape, a felony, as defined and
prescribed in sub-divisions 1, 3, and 4 of section 261 of the
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Penal Code being separate statements of the same offense, it
is therefore ordered, adjudged aud decreed that the said
Aaron Scott be punished by imprisonment in the state prison
of the State of California at San Quentin for the term prescribed by law." As so modified the judgment and the order
denying a new trial are affirmed. The judgment and the
ordor denying a new trial as to Count IV are affirmed. The
judgment and the order denying a new trial as to Count V
are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and
Schauer, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent from that portion of the majority
opinion which holds constitutional that portion of the provision of section 13 of the Dangerous Weapons' Control Act
of 1923, which makes possession of a firearm whose marks of
identification have been tampered with presumptive evidence
that the tampering was done by the possessor. In my opinion
this provision clearly violates the due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States and is therefore invalid and void.
The majority opinion states: "The tampel'ing with marks
of identification is ordinarily done in secrecy, and if the state
could not require the possessor of the firearm to explain his
possession, it would hardly be possible for th~ prosecution
to determine who committed the crime. There is nothing unreasonable in requiring the possessor to explain when and
how he came into possession of a firearm whose marks of identification have been tampered with. The presumption does
not impose on him the burden of proving who committed the
crime, nor does it require him to persuade the jury of his
innocence. He must merely go forward with evidence to the
extent of raising a reasonable doubt that he tampered with
the identification marks. When he has done so, he enjoys
the benefit of the presumption of innocence, and it is then
incumbent on the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt."
In my opinion the foregoing reasoning is unrealistic and
unsound. To my mind it is perfectly obvious that the presumption of guilt provided for in said section 13 deprives the
defendant of the presumption of innocence which is accorded
every defendant under the Constitution and laws of this
state, and to say that the presumption provided for in said
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section "does not require him (the defendant) to persUade
the jury of his innocence," is specious reasoning and wholly
unrealistic. It is obvious that under this section and under
the instruction given to the jury in the case at oar a defen':
dant could be found guilty of a violation of this section re:gardless of the explanation he gives concerning the change of
any marks of identification on a pistol or revolver in his
possession. In. other words, the statutory presumption would
constitute sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty
everi though the defendant offered positive and convincing
evidence that he had nothing to do with the making of sueli
alteration. Furthermore, there is no sound basis in fact for
the creation of such a presumption upon mere proof of pos~
session of the weapon.
. . ,
In the case of Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 [63 S.Ct.
1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519], the defendant was convicted under the·
Federal Firearms Act (52 Stat. at L. 1250, 1251, 15 U.S.C:
§ 902f), which makes it unlawful for anyone who has been
convicted of a crime of violence to receive any firearm or
ammunition that has been transported in interstate commerce.
It provides that "the possession of a firearm or ammunition
by any such person shall be presumptive evidence that such
firearm or ammunition was shipped or transported or received, as the case mny be, by such person in violation of this
Act. " The government proved that Tot had been convicted
of a crime of violence and that he was found in possession
of a loaded automatic pistol. The defendant's motion for a
directed verdict was denied and he was convicted. The conviction was reversed by the United States Supreme Court on
the ground that the provision for thc presumption was unconstitutional since there was "no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed."
With regard to the government's contention that the statute
met the established tests of due process, the court declal~d:
"But the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments set limits upon the power of Congress or that
of a state legislature to make the proof of one fact or group
of facts evidence of the existence of the ultimate fact on
which guilt is predicated...• The Government seems to argue
that there are two alternative tests of the validity of a
presumption created by statute. 'The first is that there be
a rational connection between the facts proved and the fact
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presumed j the second that of comparative convenience of
producing evidence of the ultimate fact. We are of the opinion that these are not independent tests but that the first is
. controlling and the second but a corollary. Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there
be no rational connection between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact presumed, if the .inference of the one from
proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection
between the two in common experience. This is not to say
that a valid presumption may not be created upon a view
of relation broader than that a jury might take in a speCIfic
case. But where the inference is so strained as not to have
a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know
them it is not competent for the legislature to create it as a
rule governing the procedure of courts.... It is not too much
to say that the presumptions created by the law are violent,
and inconsistent with any argument drawn from experience.
"Nor can the fact that the defendant has the better means
of information, standing alone, justify the .creation of such
a presumption.. In every criminal case the defendant has at
least an equal familiarity with the facts and in most a greater
familiarity with them than the prosecution. It might, therefore, be argued that to place upon all defendants in criminal
cases the burden of going forward with the evidence would
be proper. But the argument proves too much. If it were
sound, the legislature might validly command that the finding of an indictment, or mere proof of the identity of the
accused should create a presumption of the existence of aU
the facts essential to guilt. This is not permissible.
"Whether the statute in question be treated as expressing
the normal balance of probability, or as laying down a rule
of comparative ()onvenience in the production of evidence,
it leaves the jury free to act on the presumption alone once
the specified facts are proved, unless the defendant comes
forward with opposing evidence. And this we think enou,gh
to vitiate the statutory provision.
"Doubtless the defendants in these cases knew better than
anyone else whether they acquired the firearms or ammunition in interstate commerce~ . It would, therefore, be a convenience to the Government to rely upon the presumption and
cast on the defendants the burden of coming forward with
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evidence to rebut it. But, as we have shown, it is not permissible thus to shift the burden by arbitrarily making one fact,
'which has no relevance to guilt of the offense, the occasion
of casting on the defendant the obligation of exculpation•
The' argument from convenience is admissible only where the
inference is a permissible one, where the defendant has more
convenient access to the proof, and where requiring him to go
'forward with proof will not subject him to unfairness or hardship.... "
The Tot case compels a reversal of the judgment and order
denying anew trial on Count V. The test of due process
laid down therein is as applicable in determining the validity
of state legislation under t:\l,e Fourteenth Amendment as in
determining the validity of federal legislation under the
Fifth. There is a striking similarity between the provisions
of the Federal Firearms Act invalidated in the Tot case and
the provision of the California act in question here. Posses.sion of a firearm is presumptive evidence under the federal
act that the possessor received it in interstate commerce and
under the state act, that any tampering with the identification marks was done by the possessor. It is just as arbitrary
to infer from possession that the possessor tampered with the
identification marks as that he. received the firearm in interstate commerce. The necessity of· punishing persons who
tamper with the identification marks on firearms cannot jus.tHy convictions by unconstitutional devices designed to make
P,foof of the elements of the offense unnecessary.
:"Th'evarious circumstances under which the Supreme Court
of the United States has held presumptions invalid clearly
.establish that the presumption in the statute here involved
cannot stand. All of those cases are cited with approval in
Totv. United States, supra. In Bailey "9:. Alabama, 219 U.S.
219. [31 S.Ct. 145, 55, L.Ed. 1.91], it was made 8 crime for an
.employee, with intent to comm~t frau~ on his employer, to
cnter into a .contract to perform ser:vicesand obtain money
,thereunder and refuse to refund it or perform the services.
From the failure to refund . the money or perform the ser·.vices a presumption of. intent· to defraud was declared to
.arise. . Mr;Farland v. American Sugar Ref. 00., 241 U.S. 79
[36 S.Ot. 498,. 60 L.Ed. 899], involved a statute making it
,.8 crime for engaging in a monopoly in the sugar refining busi-

'-,;

.~%

'788

,Ii~ i

:

l!

r~

PEOPLE

v.

SCOT'!'

[UC.M

laess. It was presumed that a monopoly existed if the person systematically paid a less price for sugar in Louisiana
than he did in other states. The statute in Manley v. Georgia,
279 U.S. 1 [49 S.Ot. 215, 73 L.Ed. 575], denounced as a
crime the fraudulent insolvency of a bank and declared the
presumption that a bank which became insolvent was deemed
to have become so fraudulently. Western & Atlantic R. 00.
v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 [49 S.Ot. 445, 73 L.Ed. 884],
dealt with a state statute which declared a presumption of
negligence on the part of a railroad company when a collision occurred at a highway crossing between a train and a
vehicle. Morrison v. Oalifornia, 291 U.S. 82 [54 S.Ot. 281,
78 L.Ed. 664], involved the prohibition of the occupation
of lands by aliens, and that the state need only prove that
the defendant possessed the land and allege in the indictment
or information that he was an alien or ineligible for naturalization. The defendant must prove his citizenship. The
court said at page 90:
"Possession of agricultural land by one not shown to be
ineligible for citizenship is an act that earries with it not even
a hint of criminality. To prove such possession without more
is to take hardly a step forward in support or an indictment.
No such probability of wrongdoing grows out of the naked
fact of use or occupation as to awaken a belief that the user
or occupier is guilty if he fails to come forward with excuse
or explanation. . . . Enn so, the occasions that justify regulations of the one order have a kinship, if nothing more, to
those that justify the others. For a transfer of the burden,
experience must teach that the evidence held to be inculpatory
has at least a sinister,significance. . . .
, 'We turn to this statute and endeavor to assign it to its
cla.~s. In the law of California there is no general prohibition of the use of agricultural lands by aliens, with special
or limited provisos or exceptions. To the contrary, it is the
privilege that is general, and only the prohibition that is
limited aud special. Without preliminary proof of race, oc.
cupation of the land is not even a suspicious circumstance."
This case was first appealed to the District Court of Appea,l,
Second Appellant District, Division 1, and decided by that
tourt. 'rhe opinion rendered by that court was prepared
by Honorable Thoml1s P. White and concurred in by Justice
William Doran and PreHiding Jru;tice John York. I am in
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full accord with the views expressed in said opinion and consider it a clear and correct statement of the law applicable
to the legal proposition here involved and I adopt as a portion
of this opinion the discussion contained therein relative to
the validity of section 13 of the Dangerous Weapons' Control
Act of 1923, which is as follows:
"Finally, appellant challenges the constitutionality of cer'"
tain provisions of section 13 of the aforesaid Dangerous
Weapons' Control Act of 1923, as amended, which formed
the gravamen of Count V.
"Section 13 of the act reads as follows: ' No person shall
change, alter, remove, or obliterate the name of the maker,
model, manufacturer's number, or other mark of identification on any pistol or revolver. Possession of any such firearm
upon which the same shall have been changed, altered, removed, or obliterated, shall be presumptive evidence that such
possessor has changed, altered, removed, or obliterated the
same.' (Italics added.)
"Pursuant to the aforesaid provisions the court instructed
the jury that if they found from the evidence that the defendant was in possession of a firearm upon which the enumerated marks of identification were altered, removed or
obliterated, such possession would constitute presumptive evidence that the defendant had so changed, altered, removed
or obliterated such identifying marks.
"The constitutionality of that portion of the section which
makes possession of a firearm upon which marks of identification have been tampered with, presumptive evidence that
such possessor so changed or altered the identifying marks,
is challenged by appellant upon the ground that being an
essential element of the offense charged . . . a part of the
corpus delicti . . . the fact that the defendant made the
changes or alterations on the firearm must be proved by the
prosecution, and that the burden of such proof cannot be
shifted to the defendant by force of a legislative declaration
that because of his possession of the firearm the defendant
is presumptively guilty of the crime of making alterations
or changes thereon.
"The vice of the challenged portion of the statute, as we
view it, lies in the fact that it leaves the jury free to act upon
the presumption alone, once the specified fact of possession
is proved, unless the defendant comes forward with opposing
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evidence. Under the American philosophy of jurisprudence
and constitutional guaranties, is this not enough of itself to
vitiate the statutory provision?
"It is here sought to sustain the validity of the questioned
provisions of the statute upon the rule or principle of' ab
inconvenienti. ' This principle, it is true, has been consistently followed in this state in cases involving prosecutions
for practising medicine and other professions without a license; selling intoxicating liquors without being licensed'
so to do; illegal possession and transportation of intoxicating
liquors, and in cases involving the question of citizenship or
alienage. But in all these cases it is emphasized that the
rule of convenience is applied only where the defendant has
more convenient access to the proof, and where requiring
him to go forward with such proof will not subject him to
unfairness or hardship. In prosecutions for the doing of an
act restricted to those who are licensed therefor, the rule of
convenience is applicable because the accused, if licensed, can
immediately show it without the least inconvenience (People
v. Boo Doo Hong, 122 Cal. 606, 607 [55 P. 402]). Where a
statute made it an offense knowingly to conceal smoking
opium illegally imported and threw upon a defendant found
in possession of such opium the burden of showing that he
had not acquired it through illegal importation, the presumption was sustained on the ground that no lawful purchase
of smoking opium could occur in this country, and therefore,
the possession alone gave rise to sinister implications (Y ee
Hem v. U. S., 268 U.S. 178, ,45 S.Ot. 470, 69 L.Ed. 904).
Where an act of Congress placed upon an alien in deportation
proceedings the burden of proving his residence and of excusing his failure to procure a certificate of residence from the
Collector of Internal Revenue, it was held that in such a
situation the shifting to the alien of the burden of explanation imposed no unreasonable hardship upon him (Fang Yue
Ting v. U. S., 149 U.S. 698, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 37 L.Ed. 905).
But, as pointed out in Tot v. U. S. [319 U.S. 463], 63 S.Ot. 1241
[87 L.Ed. 1519], the fact that the defendant has the better
means of information cannot, standing alone, justify the creation of such a presumption, for the defendant in every criminal
case possesses at least an equal familiarity with the true facts,
and in most cases, a greater familiarity with them than does
the prosecution. Does that fact, however, justify' the asser-
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tion under our law, that all defendants in criminal cases
should assume the burden of going forward with the evidence? If such an argument is sound and be carried to its
logical conclusion, then why could not the Legislature val·
idly command that the finding of an indictment, the holding
of a defendant to answer by a committing magistrate, or even
mere proof of the identity of the accused, should be presumptive evidence of the existence of all the facts essential to
guilt?
"Undoubtedly the defendant in the instant case knew better than anyone else whether he himself altered the identification marks on the firearm in question. True, it would be
a convenience for the prosecution to rely upon the presumption and cast upon the defendant the burden of producing
evidence to rebut it. But the burden cannot thusbe lawfully
shifted when the fact of possession is not relevant to guilt
of the offense of altering certain identifying marks upon
the weapon. If the offense charged was possession of the
pistol without a permit, the situation would be quite different
and the presumption would be legal because neither inconvenience nor hardship would be worked upon the defendant
in requiring him to produce such a permit, while to require
the prosecution to negative s,uch possession of a permit would
require endless search of records, files and documents.
"Many people might acquire a firearm in good faith, and
unacquainted with where marks or identification are placed
upon the weapon, not even look for them. Yet such innocent
possession, under the wording of section 13 of the act creates
a presumption that such possessor is guilty of a felony and
requires him to do what might be well nigh impossible . . .
that is, produce evidence as 'to who did make the alterations.
"Respondent relies upon the case of People v. Osaki, 209
Cal. 169 [286 P. 1025], in which case proof of alienage of
the defendants was in issue in connection with the Alien
Land Law, forbidding ownership of land by Japanese aliens.
In the cited case the court upheld the presumption of alienage under section 1983 of the Code of Civil Proc~dure. But,
as in the medical and other license cases, no hardship was
worked upon the defendants in requiring them to produce
,proof of their citizenship, for such fact was peculiarly within
their knowledge, while to require the prosecution to prove
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alienage would be well nigh impossible. We think it may
fairly be stated that the principle of 'ab inconvenienti', which
is an exception to the general rule applicable to criminal
prosecutions, has, in this state, been confined to the particular line of cases where it becomes necessary, in order to constitute the offense charged, for the prosecution to prove the
non-existence of a license required by law or of a certificate
of citizenship. In such cases it is easy for the defendant to
meet the burden thus placed upon him. However, the rule
should not be applied in the enforcement of law so as to
relieve the prosecution of the imperative duty to establish
the truth of the charge made against the accused. Any relaxation of the general rule in that regard should be strictly
confined to the principle of the rule of convenience. In the
instant case it is at once apparent to us that the gravamen
of the offense denounced by section 13 of the act is not the
possession of a firearm, but the alteration, chan6ring, removal
or obliteration of certain identification marks thereon. Manifestly, if the proof of ,the prosecution under section 13 were
to stop with a showing that the accused was in possession of
the firearm, not even the corpus c.elicti of the charged offense
would be proven. In addition thereto, the prosecution must
prove that such possessor altered the identification marks on
the weapon. Indeed, such proof is vital to establish the corpus delicti of the offense charged. In our opinion, under
such circumstances, the corpus delicti ean no more be established with the aid of a presumption of defendant's guilt
because of his possession than it could be shown by the extra'judicial statements or admissions of the accused (People v.
Quarez, 196 Cal. 404 [238 P. 363]). The rule of cab incon'venienti' is not, therefore, applicable herein.
"The rule of comparative convenience of producing evidence of the ultimate fact is, in our opinion, but a corollary
to. the main and controlling test of the validity of a presumption created by statute, viz., the essential requirement that
there shall be some rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed (Tot v. U. S., [319
·U.S. 463] 63 S.Ot. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519]), and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so un. reasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate (McParland
v. American Sugar Refining 00., 241 U.S. 79 [36 S.Ct. 498,
60L.Ed. 899]). The essence of this requirement is tersely
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illustrated in the language used in Brightman v. U. S., 7 F.
2d 532, 534, involving a prosecution under the Harrison
Anti-Narcotic Act, and wherein the court said: 'there is in
our jUdgment no such rational connection between the fact
of the possession of morphine in the Western District of
Oklahoma and the fact of a purchase of it in that same district as to make the former prima facie evidence of the latter.
Common experience does not support such a presumption.'
So in the case with which we are here concerned,' we are unable to perceive any reasonable connection or rational relationship between the fact proved, viz., possession of. the
weapon, and the ultimate fact to be presumed, i. e., alteration
of identifying marks thereon. The relationship, if any, is
strained, remote and not justified in the light of commo~ experience. Section 13 of the statute herein shifts the burden of
proof, and in a criminal case deprives the' defendant of the
protection of his constitutional guaranties. Running through
all of the numerous authorities we have read on the subject,
there is to be found a concession that such a statutory rule o.f
evidence is a dangerous one, and should not be applied where
it has no intrinsic evidential force, or where its application
will impair some positive statutory or 'constitutional right.
the case of In re Wong Hane, 108 Cal. 680, 682 [41 P. 693,
49 Am.St.Rep. 138], the Supreme Court had before it an ordinance of the city of Los Angeles, the effect of which was to
make proof of the mere possession of a lottery ticket a misdemeanor, and to place upon the defendant the burden of
showing that his possession was lawful or innocent. til declaring the ordinance void as unconstitutional the court said:
'If there are any circumstances under which the possession
of a lottery ticket may be lawful or' innocent,' a defendant
who is charged with the offense ofhavirig snch ticket in his
possession is entitled to the presumption of innocence, and
cannot be compelled to establish his innocence by affirmative
proof. To the extent that the defendant is required to establish .his innocence, the provisions of the ordinance violate his
constitutional rights'. In citing with approval the case just
mentioned, Mr. Justice Preston, in a well reasoned and carefully considered dissenting opinion in People v. Troche, 206
Cal. 35, 61 [273 P. 767], sets forth the broad and historic
background of the doctrine of presumption of innocence in
the following language: 'This is no time or place for a lengthy

In

794

};

~

I
I
i

i!

,.,'II
'I
I'

,II

PEOPLE 11. SCOTT

[24 C.2d

dissertation upon this presumption, but it may be well remembered that its object is to protect the innocent and not
'to shield the guilty. It is a presumption of both law and fact.
It was present in the Roman law and some authorities state
that it marks back through Sparta and Athens to the Book of
Deuteronomy; It was known to be a part of the common law
as early as 1802. In 1817 Lord Gillies, in McKinley's Case
(33 St.Tr., 275,506), in speaking of this presumption said,
among other things: "It is a maxim which ought to be inscribed in indelible characters in the heart of every judge and
juryman; and I was happy to hear from Lord Hermand he
is inclined to give full effect to it. To overturn this· there
must be legal evidence of guilt, carrying home a degree of
conviction short only of absolute certainty." ,
"'Blackstone maintained (1753-1765) that: "the law holds
that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one
innocent suffer." (4 Bl. Com., chap. 27, margin page 358,
ad finem.) '
" 'It is the strongest presumption known to the law. It is
as much a part of our constitution, both state and national,
as if it were written therein in letters of burnished gold. This
fact has been assumed many times in this state and in one
case at least expressly stated (In re W ony Hane, 108 Cal. 680
(49 Am.St.Rep. 138,41 P. 693». We presume that no one
would contend that this presumption could be overthrown by
'any statutory enactment. Prima facie evidence or presumptions may be declared to exist where they flow logically from
certain facts, but the presumption of innocence is ever present
even in the deliberations of the jury and may alone and of
itself sometimes avail to acquit the defen,dant.'
, '" This court should be quick and decisive in its action to
declare anew our bill of rights and to preserve the essential
attributes of a jury trial as known to the common law and
as preserved by our constitution (art. I, secs. 7 and 13,
Const.). '
"The claim that application of the presumption in the instant case resulted in doing justice to the particular defendant at the bar, does not justify its application, for while a
departure from those long established, sound, legal principles
and constitutional guaranties may result in justice for a particular defendant, it is dangerous to the community, and in
the final analysis, serves only to pave the way for conviction of
the innocent.
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"Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first
footing by silent approaches and slight deviations from est!!b~
lished legal modes of procedure. In a strong dissenting,opipfon
delivered by Mr. JustiCe Sutherland of the Supreme Court of
the United States in Associated Press v. NationaZ Labor Bela:tions Board, 301 U.S. 103, 142, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81 L.Ed. 953,
we are counselled to 'withstand all beginnings of encroachment. For the saddest epitaph which can he carved in memory
of a vanished liberty is that it was lost because its possessors
failed to stretch forth a saving hand while yet there was titne. '
The acquittal of a guilty person is truly a miscarriage of justice, .but the conviction of an innocent person through relaxation of. those fundamental legal principles such as the constitutiori.al 'due process of law' provision, the presumption
'that a person is innocent of crime or wrori.g' (Code of Ciy.
Proc., § 1963, subd. 1), would be a tragedy. It is the duty
of the courts to be watchful of the constitutional and inalienable individual rights of the citizens and to halt any stealthy
encroachments thereon.
.
"We here quote the powerful and significant language of
the late Mr. Presiding Justice Houser of this court in the case
of People V. Bullock, 123 Cal.App. 299, 305 [11 P.2d 441],
wherein he said: 'I reluctantly concur in the judgment. My
consent to the affirmance of the judgment has resulted solely
from the compelling force of the precedents as established
by the cases to which, in the opinion of my associate, attention has been. directed. It is clear. that the constitutional guaranty of "due process of law" is in great danger of being set
a,~ naug:jlt. With but slight extension of the rule,either as
promulgated by the statute, or as judicially announced pre~
ceding its enactment, in any criminal prosecution in which
the district attorney may find it difficult to produce evidence
of the guilt of the defendant, he may invoke the doctrine of
"ab inconvenienti"· and thus shift to the defendant the entire
burden of establishing his innocence. The formerly time-honored, but not-greatly respected, rule of law which requires
the prosecution to prove beyond a' reasonable doubt every
essential element of the crime of the commission of which the
defendant is charged, would appear to have been given a construction which would seem to be wholly at variance with the
plain language of the ordinary rule and completely out. of
harmony with ancient judicial precedents. It is hut a short
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step backward to a former procedure which permitted prosecution on mere hearsay information, and on which, in the absence of the most positive affirmative proof of innocence, the
accusation itself was sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction. To my mind, the trend of judicial utterance is too
much toward the abrogation of many of those constitutional
principles which affect human rights and which were most
dearly obtained. With the destruction of the doctrine of
"burden of proof on the prosecution," no innocent man will
be safe; but personal liberty will again become a prized, if
not an uncommon, condition or attribute to the citizens of the
republic.'
"We therefore conclude that the portion of section 13 of
the aforesaid act which provides that' possession of any such
firearm upon which the same shall have been changed, altered,
removed or obliterated, shall be presumptive evidence that
such possessor has changed, altered, removed, or obliterated
the same' is unconstitutional and void; that therefore the
giving to the jury of the instruction embodying such presumption constituted prejudicial error and invaded the substantial rights of the defendant."
In my opinion the judgment of conviction against the defendant under Count 5 of the information should be reversed.

[L. A. No. 18573. In Bank.
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R. BERNARD DICKEY, Respondent, v. RAISIN PRORATION ZONE NO. 1 et al., Appellants.
[la-lc] Agriculture-Proration-Pledge of Surplus.-Under the
Agricultural Prorate Act, the program committee of a prorate
zone has implied authority to pledge to the Commodity Credit
Corporation surplus raisins placed in a stabilization pool as
security for loans to cover expenses in the handling and storage of pooled raisins, and as additional collateral for nonrecourse loans on the balance of the crop made available to
all producers desiring such financial assistance. (Stats. 1933,
p. 1969, § 19.1; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 143a.)
McK. Dig. References: [1,3,7] Agriculture, § 4; [2] Statutes,
§.114; [4] Statutes, § 136; [5] Public Officers, § 42; [6] Statutes,
§138.
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[2] Statutes - Construction - Legislative Intent.-'-Statutes are

construed according to the intention, or at least according
to the apparent or evident intention or purpose, of the legislature.
[3] Agriculture-Proration-Purpose.-The Agricultural Prorafu
Act, § 19.1, does not set up a formal trust with the contributors as such the sole beneficiaries, but it envisages a program
by state agencies acting not primarily for individual contrib.
utors but in the interest of the public welfare.
[4] Statutes - Construction-Implications.-Where the Legislature has clearly set forth the purpose of an act and enacted
• a ground plan or design for its accomplishment, the implemental portions of the act must be construed so as to achieve
its object.
[5] Public Officers-Powers-Implied Powers.-Governmental officials may exercise such additional powers as are necessary
for the due and efficient administration of powers expressly
granted, or as may fairly be implied from the statute granting
the powers.
[6] Statutes-Construction-Expressio UniuB Rule.-The maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius and other rules of statutory construction have no application where the effect is to
nullify the essence of a statute by subordinating its purpose
to a supposed limitation of its implemental terms. Such rules
will not be utilized to contradict or vary a clear expression of
legislative intent in a matter of vital concern to the state.
[7] Agriculture - Proration - Construction. - The Agricultural
Prorate Act is to be construed so as to render it reasonable,
fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and to avoid
mischievous or absurd consequences.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Fresno County. Ernest Klette, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Action to require an accounting to nonborrowing raISIn
growers for amounts realized from disposition of surplus
raisins delivered to a stabilization pool. Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions.
Francis M. Shea, Assistant Attorney General (U.S.),
Charles H. Carr and Leo V. Silverstein, U. S. Attorneys, Ron[2] See 23 Ca1.Jur. 725; 50 Am.Jur. 200.
[5] See 21 Ca1.Jur. 874; 23 Cal.Jur. 739; 43 Am.Jur. 69.
[6] See 23 Cal.Jur. 740; 50 Am.Jur. 240.

